The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between related party transactions (RPT) and earnings management. This study argues there is a different influence between RPT a priori likely to result in expropriation and RPT a priori not likely to result in expropriation. RPT a priori likely to result in expropriation creates an incentive to management or controlling shareholder to overstate income to cover or mask their expropriation. This study uses non-absolute discretionary accruals based on Kazsnik model to proxy earnings management. Corporate governance mechanism should reduce the incentive to overstate income in a company that involves in RPT a priori likely to result in expropriation. The results of this study show that the earnings management (income increasing) is affected by the existence of RPT a priori likely to result in expropriation and corporate governance mechanism, but it is not affected by the size/value of the transactions. As expected, companies involving in RPT a priori likely to result in expropriation with weak corporate governance mechanism, tend to manage earnings that increase income. We find that strong corporate governance mechanism decreases the discretionary accruals in companies which have RPT a priori likely to result in expropriation.
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The transaction may not be conducted with reasonable price and also there may be conflict of interest.
Transactions that are carried out with insiders (controlling shareholders or management) can create incentives for expropriation, that is, take advantage from corporate profits, using his authority to influence the terms of the transaction in accordance with their personal goals and otherwise, the cost of other shareholders or minority shareholders. Thus, the RPT is not consistent with the objectives of the company to maximize shareholder wealth. When the Executive or the Commissioner participated in the RPT, then they have incentives to manage earnings to increase their personal benefit, or possibly to cover acts of expropriation (Gordon and Henry, 2005) .
Not a lot of research that focuses on the relationship between RPT and earnings management. Gordon and Henry (2005) In the development of earnings management theory, it has been investigated several factors that allegedly become earnings management incentive, including bonus plan hypothesis, debt covenant hypothesis, and improving performance during IPO process. This research contributes in terms of identifying other motivation to earnings management, that is to cover or disguise RPT that apriori likely to result in expropriation done by management or controlling shareholders.
The mechanism of corporate governance (CG) in a company is considered to limit the expropriation of minority shareholder's wealth through RPT, as well as to limit earnings management. Therefore, it will be important to assess the effect of RPT on earnings management by considering corporate governance factor, as a mechanism that could weaken the relationship between the RPT and earnings management. In contrast to research Gordon and Henry (2005) , this study not only look at the relationship between the RPT and earnings management, but also will consider the corporate governance mechanisms that influence the relationship between RPT and earnings management.
-3 - This study aims to look at other possible motives in earnings management, that is to disguise or cover losses due to RPT. Thus it can be presumed that the degree of earnings management in companies that involve in RPT will vary with the degree of earnings management in companies that do not involve in RPT. Cheung, et al. (2006) , which classifies RPT into three groups discussed earlier, revealed that the company announced apriori adverse RPT will experience significant negative excess return. This study will look at the influence of the existence of various types of RPT (a priori adverse RPT and a priori not adverse RPT) on earnings management, than companies that do not perform these RPT.
It can be expected that there will be a higher H1c: CG practices negatively affect discretionary accruals.
As explained earlier that the results of research Gordon & Henry (2005) showed that not all types of RPT associated with earnings management.
Therefore, it can be assumed that different types of RPT will have a different effect on earnings management. By using the classification of RPT by Cheung, et al. (2006) , this research is expected to show higher incentives to manage earnings in a company that involve in a priori adverse RPT compared with companies that does a priori not adverse RPT. This happens because a priori adverse RPT likely to have a negative impact to corporate profits. To cover or disguise the loss impact, the company that makes a priori adverse RPT will have an incentive to engage in more income increasing than that of companies that do not conduct a priori adverse RPT. Thus, the next hypothesis is:
H2a: Companies with a priori adverse RPT will have higher discretionary accruals than companies with a priori not adverse RPT.
The value (size) of RPT will certainly have a different effect on earnings management.
Consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis, the greater the value of RPT, the company will make greater income increasing to cover the impact of RPT. This is due to the larger the value of RPT will certainly have a greater impact to profits.
Meanwhile, based on the efficient transactions hypothesis, the greater the value of RPT will not create incentive to manage earnings because there is no loss impact that need to be covered.
Thus, the next hypothesis is:
H2b: The value (size) of RPT affect discretionary accruals.
Furthermore, based on a priori theory from Cheung, et al. (2006) , which classifies RPT transaction that is a priori adverse RPT and not adverse RPT, it can be presumed that the value (size) of a priori adverse RPT will have a greater positive impact on the degree of earnings management compared to a priori not adverse RPT. Thus the next hypothesis that can be proposed is:
H2c: The effect of value (size) of a priori adverse RPT to discretionary accruals will be more positive than the a priori not adverse RPT.
As discussed earlier that the CG mechanism is considered effectively overseeing the expropriation of the company through RPT. Gordon et al. (2004) and Gao and Kling (2008) found that strong CG mechanism prevent adverse RPT.
Thus, the a priori adverse RPT effect on earnings management depends on the mechanism of CG.
Companies with a priori adverse RPT and has a weak CG mechanism would be easier to conduct aggressive earnings management than companies without a priori not adverse RPT. While strong corporate governance will reduce the aggressive There are four differences from previous studies done by Gordon & Henry (2005) . First, this study will look at earnings management level in a period of one year after the announcement of transaction, while Gordon & Henry (2005) We use cross sectional Kaznik (1999) model to calculate discretionary accruals:
Whereas, TACC it = total accrual year t, TA it-1 = total asset at the beginning of year t; ΔREV it = change in revenue between year t and t-1; ΔREC it = change in receivables between year t and t-1; PPE it = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t; ΔCFO it = change in cash flows from operation between year t and t-1.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of the sample selection is as shown in Table 1 . Table 2 shows a summary of the descriptive statistics of the sample combined non RPT and The result of regression model (a) as shown in Table 4 . Further, since the existence of RPT does not have a different effect on discretionary accrual, we cannot be sure to say that the RPT is an efficient transaction. So we need to carry out the second regression model with a sub-sample of firms that conduct RPT.
RPT
The result in table 5 suggests that discretionary accruals of companies with a priori adverse RPT will not be higher than companies with a priori not adverse RPT. Thus, hypothesis 2a is not accepted, which not indicate a higher incentive to manage earnings to increase income in a company that perform a priori adverse RPT.
The size of RPT does not necessarily indicate that the company engaged in earnings management actions. Thus, hypothesis 2b is not accepted, means the amount (size) of RPT has no effect on discretionary accruals. Similarly, hypothesis 2c was also not accepted, that the effect of the amount (size) of a priori adverse RPT are not more positively associated with discretionary accruals than a priori not adverse RPT. This also means that the actions to increase profits does not depend on its size of transactions.
The result show that strong CG mechanism will reduce aggressive earnings management.
Consistent with the results of first hypothesis that use combined sample of RPT and non-RPT, means that the stronger the CG practices, the more conservative accruals policies been adopted. will have a high discretionary accruals. Consistent with previous results, the control variable SIZE has a significant positive effect on discretionery accruals.
After testing the second model, we are still not These results consistent with the findings of Gordon & Henry (2005) 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The implication of this study that the existence of RPT is not necessarily an indication of a In addition, strong CG mechanism is proven to reduce the incentive earnings management to increase income in the company that conduct a priori adverse RPT. This result suggests to the investors that they can rely on the company's CG mechanism to prevent earnings management.
Although not all RPT are adverse, but investors should be alert to the types of RPT which has negative impact to the company. To be able to see 
